The Syrian Crisis
Syrian Migrants

Article written by: Giancarlo Elia Valori 

It is easy to predict what will happen: Europe will fail economically under the weight of the cost of welfare, granted to the millions of migrants coming to our coasts. Our productions are mostly  “mature” and the Euro area’s public debt does not allow it to have the sufficient elasticity to support this great extra humanitarian effort.

Furthermore, the arrival of huge masses of migrants - fostered by an ideology à la carte, which has become dominant in Europe – will create wide areas of identity-based electorate, which will weigh heavily on the politicking of the various candidates in the elections. They will vote and our voters will be increasingly pushed into the no-vote area. Thanks to the aforementioned ideology; à la carte; the electoral issues will leave voters dissatisfied and will favour the newcomers. The distracted and minority voters of the still opulent West will be replaced by passionate, identity-based, sectarian and allogeneic voters.

Moreover, the mass of migrants will be employed in the informal network of “grey” economies - hence the fiscal return of immigration will be less and less relevant and the cost of welfare will get higher. Hence, a Europe without identity, without any strategic idea, doesn’t have the possibility of building a project of its own, independent from the Middle East crisis which is engulfing it. A continent which will have to choose between the feeble Atlantic support - with reference to the correlation between the EU and the US policies, especially at an economic level - and the acceptance of the Russian ukase, which will imply the relinquishment of the Atlantic link and the ultimate regionalization of the Old Continent.

Europe will be destined in this case, to serve as the productive and technological area of an economically weak system, as was the case with East Germany towards the USSR, during the period of the Warsaw Pact. I am reminded of a passage from the Voyage en Russie by De Custine: a nobleman got out of his carriage and started to whip the coachman, who did not react. This will be our future as Europe, if we sell ourselves out to the East without a clear do ut des relationship which, however, should always be monitored. This will be the final scene of the European crisis, floundering between couch humanitarianism and an irrational populist reaction which is impossible to manage just as the landings of migrants.

Two solutions which do not grasp the real core of the European problem

The primary fault lies with those who set fire to the Greater Middle East, by targeting Iran, with which they reached a questionable agreement in exchange for an economic opening we cannot yet assess exactly. But it certainly won’t be the one enthusiastically foreseen by analysts. They set fire to the Maghreb region with the “Arab springs”, the sunny version of the “orange revolutions” in the Caucasus region. They wanted to isolate Al Qaeda, but the internal networks parallel to the jihad covered up the “revolution” by using it for their own purposes.

The “boys” of Tahrir Square in Cairo were protected by the paramilitaries of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was to win the elections temporarily, just in time to open the Sinai peninsula to the sword  jihad against Israel and to destabilize the Egyptian peripheries. Not to mention the creation of the two primary strategic variables, after the JCPOA of the P5+1 with Iran: China’s  entry into the Middle East region through the “new” Iran and the loss of geopolitical meaning of the war in Syria, which was started to isolate Iran.

Hence, why should we give the area bordering on Iran to the Sunnis, thus de facto destabilizing the Old Continent? Is Iran maybe more important than Europe, according to some inexperienced strategists? Europe is unable to fight and hence to think of itself. “Those who fight may lose, but those who do not fight have already lost” as “Che Guevara used to say.  Heidegger maintained that thinking as a way to set boundaries and thinking of means to set limits. Europe thinks of itself as a non-identity, partially because of the permanence of national mechanisms and partially because of its still insufficient and far-fetched economic and monetary union, which also forebodes tensions in the market-world.

In conclusion, we could say that:

a) an intervention force of the European nations will be created in Syria to protect the areas still free from the Caliphate and from the Syria of Bashar el Assad, who is certainly “a tyrant” - as the naive pro-Western storytelling maintains - but is always better than Al Baghdadi and his ferocious “Caliphate”;

b) a new division of the Greater Middle East will be defined, which shall be left to the friendly regimes of Europe and the West, just as in the days of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.

Syria, with a part of the Lebanon, under a non-Sunni post-Baathist regime, is protected by a treaty between Russia, Europe and the United States; and Lebanon - regardless of the local religious factionalism – is under the EU tutelage, even at a military level, so we can consider that the timing of the UNIFIL II mission could be defined as an occupation force. As theorized by some of its strategists, Iran will be projected onto the Caucasian and Central-Asian Shia area, towards its own terrestrial dimension which marginalizes Iran’s threatening posture in the Persian Gulf.

Iraq, the “primary fault” of universal; though random; democratization of the 1990s - the disco music of geopolitics - will be managed by a treaty which will acknowledge the Russian and the Iranian weight, as well as the European and Chinese interests – all issues which cannot be solved by the business as usual of oil companies. New thinking is needed: “thought is the blossom; language the bud; action the fruit behind it”, as Ralph Waldo Emerson used to say.